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A Permanently Neutral State in the
Security Council
HERIBERT FRANZ KOECK*
On October 20, 1972, the Republic of Austria was elected, by the
General Assembly of the United Nations, a non-permanent member of
the Security Council.' This was the first time that a permanently neu-
tral state had obtained a seat in the Council, which, since the advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Competence of the
General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Na-
tions,2 must be considered the leading political organ of the United
Nations.
This recent step in the development of the United Nations position
towards neutrality was certainly not foreseen by the founding fathers
of the Charter. An analysis of the preparatory documents of the United
Nations Charter proves, to the contrary, that the status of permanent
neutrality was then considered incompatible even with simple member-
ship in the Organization.3
If permanent neutrality was not expressly banished by the 1945 San
Francisco Conference, the attitude towards neutral states was dearly
shown by the fact that delegates from Switzerland were refused admis-
* Lecturer, Department of International Law (Public) and International Relations,
University of Vienna. Dr. iur. 1964, University of Vienna; M.C.L. 1970, University of
Michigan. The views expressed are exclusively those of the author.
1. 27 U.N. GA. Provisional Records, plenary meeting, October 20, 1972.
2. Advisory Opinion on Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of
a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.CJ. 4, 8-9.
3. The committee which dealt with the purposes and principles of the Charter con-
sidered the question of neutrality at length and reported "that the status of permanent
neutrality is incompatible with the principles declared in . .. the Charter." Doc. 944,
I/1/34(1), 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 459-60 (1945). As a result, the problems of how and where
in the Charter the principle was to be expressed were left unresolved.
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sion to the meetings at San Francisco, even as observers.4 Further proof
of the original conviction that neutrality and participation in the Or-
ganization were incompatible is manifested by the practically unani-
mous opinion of those international scholars who dealt with the Charter
of the United Nations or, more specifically, with the status of perma-
nent neutrality, in the years after 1945. Both Goodrich-Hambrou and
Kelsen 6 assumed that a neutral position was incompatible with the
principle of collective security on which the Charter's peace-keeping
system was based.7 As late as 1966, by which time the attitude of the
United Nations towards neutrality had already undergone a funda-
mental change, Chowdhury argued that "the recognition of a status of
permanent neutrality of a member is not only inconsistent with but
ultra vires to the provisions of the Charter."
8
Yet, the intention of the San Francisco Conference and all of the con-
clusions drawn from it apparently have been overruled by twenty-
seven years of practice within the Organization. It is, therefore, necessary
to turn to this practice and examine the manner in which the Organiza-
tion has interpreted, or rather re-interpreted, the relevant provisions
of the Charter. Before doing so, however, a short restatement of the
traditional status of permanent neutrality is appropriate.
4. M. NEF, VERSCHIEDENE GESTALTEN DER NEuTRALrrXT 3 ff. (1956). This hostility,
among politicians, international lawyers, and the public, was a logical consequence of
the experiences gained during World War II. As early as 1940, at a time when the
United States had not yet become actively engaged in fighting, Quincy Wright had
excluded neutrality as a proper position of a state in the re-organized international
world to come: "In guaranteeing appropriate spheres both ... to the state, and to the
world community, international law must recognize that the whole is greater than its
parts. This implies that states of war and neutrality, recognizing the power of the part
through violence or indifference to invalidate the will of the whole, are by nature
inconsistent with law." The Present Status of Neutrality, 34 Am. J. INT'L L. 391, 415
(1940).
5. L. GOODRICH & E. HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND
DOCUMENTS 108, 132 (2d rev. ed. 1949).
6. H. KELsEN, THE LAW OF THE UNrrID NATIONs: A CRITICAL ANALYsIs OF ITS FUNDA-
MENTAL PROBLEMS 94, 108 (1950).
7. It is significant that Kelsen, in the index to his book, makes no reference to
neutrality except in the following connection: "Neutrality-Incompatible with the
Charter." Id. at 896. With reference to the duties of neutrality or the status of perma-
nent neutralization. Kelsen went so far as to argue from article 2(6) of the Charter
(by which the obligations of article 2(5) are imposed on non-member states) that even
the latter were not allowed to refuse to give assistance to an enforcement action by the
United Nations against a member or non-member state, thereby ruling out permanent
neutrality completely and quite independently from actual membership in the Orga-
nization. Id. at 108.
8. R. CHOWDHURY, MILITARY ALLIANCES AND NEUTRALITY IN WAR AND PEACE 207 (1966).
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I
THE TRADITIONAL STATUS OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY
Neutrality is of two kinds.9 As the attitude of a state that does not
participate in a war being waged between two or more other states, it is
called mere neutrality. On the other hand, the position of a state that
undertakes the international obligation not to enter into any future
war between other states is called permanent neutrality.
Mere neutrality is historically the older form. Its legal shape developed
during the eighteenth century when international legal writers such
as Bynkershoek 10 and Vattel" insisted on the neutral's duty of real
impartiality.' 2 The classical period of neutrality extended from 1793 to
1919, i.e., from the declaration of neutrality by the United States in
the war between revolutionary France and the so-called First Coalition
to the foundation of the League of Nations. Neutrality gained high
esteem during the nineteenth century. A neutral state was regarded as
being entrusted with the special task of strengthening peaceful rela-
tions among the members of the international community and as
having the mission under international law to safeguard peace, national
freedom, and progress in international relations.'3 It was called upon
to aid the parties to a conflict that had already erupted by offering
mediation to help restore peace.' 4 Verosta, therefore, calls the policy of
a neutral state-as the concept developed during the nineteenth cen-
9. The foundation of the law of neutrality did not develop before the Middle Ages,
although de facto neutrality is certainly as old as the international community itself.
But see 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TP.arusE § 285 (7th ed. H. Lauter-
pacht 1952). Oppenheim considers the fourteenth century's Consulato del mare as the
first source of what later came to be regarded as the law of neutrality. Id. § 286 n.1.
10. C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESrIONUM JuRIs PUBLICI UBRI DUO 67 (Book I, 1737).
11. M. DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LOI NATURELLE § 103 (Book
M, 1758).
12. Earlier, it had been common for a neutral state to grant passage to the troops of
a belligerent or to give some other support. 2 L. OPPENrEIM, supra note 9, at 285-86.
This is proof that although Grotius had recognized neutrality as an institution of inter-
national law, it had not by then developed into a clear concept. H. GRorlus, DE INRE
BELLI AC PACTS LMRI TaRs § 3 (Book m, ch. 17, 1646).
13. Verdross, Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United Nations Organization,
50 AM. J. INT'L L. 61, 64 (1956), referring to the evaluation made by the famous Belgian
politician, Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, in a report to the Belgian Academy of Sciences
in 1875.
14. See Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779 (1903), T.S. No. 392. See also Hague Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, arts. II-VIII, 36 Stat. 2199 (1911),
T.S. No. 536.
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tury-pacigrance, i.e., conduct of peace in contrast to the conduct of
war.15
Mere neutrality, however, is unable to fulfill the high expectations set
for a neutral state. Since this state has no obligation to refrain from en-
tering into the war on whatever side it considers its interests to be best
served, mere neutrality is a momentary status and, by that fact, con-
tributes to international instability rather than to stability. It was the
institution of permanent neutrality, then, that was used by the Great
Powers in Europe to safeguard the equilibrium among themselves by
permanently neutralizing certain parts of the continent. The first
country to be permanently neutralized was the Swiss Confederation by
its adherence to the declaration of the Allied Powers of March 20, 1815,16
and by the Act of May 27, 1815.17 Following the (second) Peace Treaty
of Paris of November 20, 1815,18 the Powers undertook to guarantee
Switzerland's permanent neutrality.' 9 By these actions Swiss neutrality,
until then merely de facto, became a permanent de jure international
institution, creating obligations for Switzerland as well as for the guaran-
teeing Powers.
Switzerland did not remain for long the only permanently neutral
state in Europe; Belgium was neutralized in 1831 and Luxemburg in
1867. Switzerland, however, has made the most significant contribution
to the development of the international law of neutrality as it is now
found.2 0
Permanent neutrality encompasses a number of special obligations
for the permanently neutral state. Beyond the duties to obey the special
international rules of neutrality derived from the duty of impartiality
in wartime and to defend its territory by all means against foreign
attack, so as not to permit any belligerent to gain a strategic advantage,
the permanently neutral state is obliged not to enter into any peace-
15. S. VERosrA, DIE DAUEENDmE NzumArrAXT: EIN GRUNiss 142 (1967).
16. Declaration of the Congress of Vienna on Switzerland, March 20, 1815, in 2 G.
MARTENs, NOUVEAU RECUEmL Dz TRArrts Dz PAix 157 (1818).
17. Act of Accession of the Swiss Confederation, May 27, 1815, id. at 173.
18. Peace Treaty of Paris, November 20, 1815, id. at 682.
19. Act by which the Allies Recognize the Neutrality of Switzerland, November 20,
1815, id. at 740.
20. The international law of neutrality is largely contained in two Hague conventions:
Hague Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutrals in War on Land, October 18, 1907,
86 Stat. 2310 (1911), TS. No. 540; and Hague Convention on Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers in Naval War, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415 (1911), TS. No. 545.
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time commitment that may involve the country in a future war.21 On
the other hand, the permanently neutral state is, within the borderlines
thus drawn, completely free in determining its domestic and foreign
policy. It is not bound to observe any ideological neutrality. It may have
and freely announce its own opinion on any political or legal question
concerning peace and good conduct in the international community.22
Austria's permanent neutrality is of relatively recent origin.2
3 It
dates from 1955, when the Austrian foreign office notified all the states
with which Austria had diplomatic relations24 that the Austrian parlia-
ment25 had enacted a Constitutional Federal Law2 6 declaring Austria
permanently neutral "for the purpose of the permanent maintenance
of its external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability
of its territory."27 The states so notified were asked to recognize the
new Austrian status. Most of them, including the signatories of the
21. Thus, it may not enter into treaties of alliance or guaranty, or agreements estab.
lishing a supra-national economic system of high structural interdependence that might
make the participating neutral an indirect supporter of a belligerent if one state of the
community should go to war. For this reason, neither Switzerland nor Austria nor the
de facto neutral states of Sweden and Finland has ever applied for full membership in
the European Communities. On this question, see E. STN AND P. HAY, LAw AND IN-
SITrMONS IN ThE ATLANIc AaEA 70, 74 (1967).
22. See Verdross, supra note 13, at 63-64; Zemanek, Gutachten zu den von dem Volks-
begehren zur Abschaffung des Bundesheeres (Bundesheervolksbegehren) Aufgeworfenen
Neutralitdtsrechtlichen und Neutralitdtspolitischen Fragen, 10 Osrmaa ruscre Zsrr-
scHauFr Fi)R AussENporuTm 115, 124 (1970); G. KAmINSKY, BmVAFFNErE NEUTnALrXT
(1971); Verosta, supra note 15, at 13. The clarification of Switzerland's status of perma-
nent neutrality has been enhanced in recent years by several official Swiss government
statements based on the experiences of World War II. See in particular an official state-
ment of the Swiss conception of neutrality, in Guggenheim, La Pratique Suisse, 14
ScHWnVEMUSCHES JAumUcH FUr INTEmNATioNALES Rcur 127, 195-99 (1957).
23. Yet, various efforts to have Austria neutralized can be traced back to the end of
World War I. Verosta, Die Internationale Stellung der Republik osterreich Seit 1918,
1918-1968: OsrERECH---50 JAnmE REPUBL 59 (Institut fir Osterreichkunde ed. 1968).
24. For the text of the November 14, 1955 Austrian note to the State Department,
see Recognition of Austrian Neutrality, Dep't of State Press Release No. 680, December
6, 1955, in 33 Ds, T STATE BuLL. 1011 (July-Dec. 1955).
25. The Austrian notification was in fulfillment of a commitment undertaken by the
Austrian delegation in the Moscow Memorandum of April 15, 1955, Memorandum Con-
cerning the Results of the Conversation Between the Government Delegation of the
Republic of Austria and the Government Delegation of the Soviet Union, 32 DaP'r
STATE BULL. 1011 (transl. Jan.-June 1955), 49 Am. J. Ius'L L. 191 (Supp. transl. 1955).
This undertaking was in exchange for an agreement by the Soviet Union to ratify the
State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria, the
text of which is reproduced in 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 162 (Supp. transl. 1955).
26. [1955] Austrian BGBI. 211.
27. Austria also declared its intention to defend this status with all possible means
and never in the future to accede to military alliances or to permit the establishment
of foreign military bases on its territory. The English version of this brief statute is
given in Kunz, Austria's Permanent Neutrality, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 418, 420 (1956).
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Austrian State Treaty (France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
and the United States), followed the request;28 other states merely took
cognizance of the Austrian act.2 9
This notification of Austria's intention to become a permanently
neutral state, and the corresponding recognition by the other countries,
created a system of multilateral international obligations which can be
characterized as contractual or quasi-contractual. By this system Austria
is bound to observe the rules of international law with regard to per-
manently neutral states. At the same time those members of the inter.
national community which have recognized Austria's special status are
obligated to refrain from all acts that are incompatible with this status
and which might endanger or make more difficult Austria's task of ob-
serving the strict international standard of permanent neutrality.8 0
II
THE POLITICS OF AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY
Although bound by the wording of the Moscow Memorandum to
practice a neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland,3 ' the
Austrian approach to fundamental international questions differs from
the Swiss model.32 This is particularly true regarding the question of
membership in the United Nations. While Switzerland has until now
considered participation in the Organization as contrary to its cautious
international neutral policy,33 if not to its legal obligations as a per-
28. For the United States' recognition of Austria's permanent neutrality, see Recog-
nition of Austrian Neutrality, supra note 24, at 1012.
29. Since Austria did not, at that time,'entertain diplomatic relations with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China they were not notified of Austria's declaration and consequently
did not directly take a position. Zemanek, Neutral Austria in the United Nations, 15
INT'L ORO. 408, 409 n.8 (1961).
80. See Kunz, supra note 27, at 422, 424.
81. See Moscow Memorandum, supra note 25.
32. Kunz, supra note 27, at 422, states that the reference to Switzerland in the Moscow
Memorandum served only to define the status of permanent neutrality in general, be-
cause Switzerland was, at that time, the only example, of a permanently neutral state.
He suggests that the Memorandum did not intend to bind Austria rigidly to the Swiss
precedent. This appears to be correct; if Austria should follow a line of action that
displeases the Soviet Union, for example, it could hardly excuse itself by pointing to
similar conduct by Switzerland. This means that the standard of neutrality that Austria
must observe is to be determined objectively, i.e., by reference to the norms of the inter-
national law of neutrality, and not subjectively, according to the conduct of any par-
ticular permanently neutral state.
38. Note the position taken on this question by Prof. Bindschedler, legal adviser to
the Swiss Political Department (foreign office), in Bindschedler, Grundlagen der
Schweizerischen Aussenpolitik, 4 0 amntmamscrE ZzrrscHrsu-r AiRi AussENsoLir 75,
87-88 (1964).
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manently neutral state, Austria was anxious to join the Organization as
soon as possible.
Austria applied for admission to the United Nations in 1947, when
it was still occupied by the four Allies; its status of full sovereignty was
therefore quite doubtful.84 Although the application was unsuccessful,
the reason is to be found not in the fact of Austria's occupation, but
rather, in the general deadlock that had developed in the Security
Council after 1947 by reason of the Cold War, a factor which prevented
many other states from joining the Organization. The Austrian State
Treaty of 1955, however, contained two references which gave the
Great Powers' support to Austria's membership in the United Nations:
in the preamble the Four Powers promised "to support Austria's ap-
plication for admission to the United Nations"; and in article 17 the
phrase "after Austria becomes a member of the United Nations" was
used. In fulfillment of this obligation 35 the Security Council, on De-
cember 14, 1955, unanimously recommended the admission of Austria to
the United Nations.86 On the same day, the General Assembly, by
unanimous vote, admitted Austria to membership.37 This admission was
effected without granting Austria any special status within the Organi-
zation as a permanently neutral state; nevertheless, it took place in full
cognizance of Austria's status and only a week after its permanent neu-
trality had been recognized by four of the five permanent members of
the Security Council.
8s
As startling as the admission of a permanently neutral state to the
United Nations has been to several observers, it does not appear il-
logical if considered in the light of the ten years of experience gained
by the Organization between 1945 and 1955. The United Nations,
originally an anti-fascist coalition of World War II participants, took
a negative position towards neutral attitudes and tendencies.3 9 In
34. The Austrian application was deposited on July 2, 1947. Admission was, however,
barred for the time being by the Soviet Union's negative vote in the Security Council.
See REPERTORY OF UNrrED NATIONS PRACrICE 170 (1955).
35. This did not occur without another Soviet veto of Austria's admission. Admission
was finally accomplished as part of a package deal permitting the simultaneous entry
of states aligned with both the Western and Eastern blocs.
36. Letter from the President of the Security Council to the President of the General
Assembly, December 14, 1955, in 10 U.N. SCOR, 705th meeting 6 (1955).
37. G.A. Res. 995(x), 10 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 21, at 7, U.N. Doc.
A/Res./3 at 65 (1955).
38. See Zemanek, supra note 29, at 409. See generally Blechner, Osterreichs Weg in
die Vereinten Nationen, 1 6srERRcsrscm zZrrscmurr ri AUSSENPOLrITK 351 (1961).
39. Taubenfeld wrote in 1953: "[S]uch a status, in the full traditional sense, is not
19731
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the context of a system of collective security that obligates each member
state to cooperate in meeting aggression, neutrality appears as egotism
and cowardice. Thus, the procedure under chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter envisaging, if necessary, military measures against the
aggressor state,40 and the obligation of all members under article 25 "to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance
with the present Charter," originally made membership by a permanently
neutral state appear inconceivable. Such a strictly negative evaluation
of the institution of permanent neutrality, derived from the point of
view of collective security, was, however, dependent upon the ability of
the United Nations to actually transfer into reality the principal
of collective security. Since the outbreak of the Cold War, it has
become unlikely that the United Nations could employ effective coer-
cive measures,41 principally by reason of the return to the traditional
phenomenon of opposing power blocs. As first reflected in the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, the return to the traditional power bloc thinking
of belligerents and neutrals presupposed the existence of neutral states
in a future war.42
Actually, the creation of multilateral defense agreements that could
claim some legitimacy under article 51 of the Charter, affirming the
inherent right of individual and collective self-defense against an armed
attack, had, as its logical consequence, a balance-of-power system in
which permanent neutrality was able to regain its previous status.48 A
legally tenable for Members of the United Nations in the course of a unified action.
... The actual position of neutrals has been on the decline in the overall picture since
the first World War, and ...must continue to decline." International Actions and
Neutrality, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 377, 395 (1953).
40. Article 42 of the United Nations Charter provides that in instances where mea-
sures not involving the use of armed force would be inadequate or have already proved
to be so, the Security Council "may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."
41. Even the United Nations sponsored action in the Korean War was due to a vital
misinterpretation by the Soviet Union of the legal effects of its absence from the Secu-
rity Council and not to the proper functioning of the Organization. See L. SOHN,
CAsEs oN UNrrED NATIONS LAW 479 ff. (2d rev. ed. 1967).
42. First Geneva Convention, August 12, 1949, arts. 4, 8, 10, & 11, 75 U.N.T.S. 81,
33-38; Second Geneva Convention, August 12, 1949, arts. 5, 8, 10, & 11, 75 U.N.T.S. 85,
89-93; Third Geneva Convention, August 12, 1949, arts. 8, 10, & 11, 75 U.N.T.S. 135,
143-46; Fourth Geneva Convention, August 12, 1949, arts. 9, 11, & 12, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,
295-96.
43. On regional defense agreements, collective security, and neutrality see Kormanicki,
The Place of Neutrality in the Modern System of International Law, 80 REcUEL DFS
Cours 399, 483-90 (1952). Zemanek, supra note 29, at 411, states:
Because of their measurable quantities of manpower, industrial output and
potential destructive force, these opposing pact-organizations established a
[Vol. 6: 137
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permanently neutral state could again consider its mission to be the
facilitation of contacts between hostile camps and the promotion of
initiatives for compromise solutions. Therefore, since the United Nations
was incapable of realizing a pattern of collective security, a permanently
neutral state that carried out a policy of pacigirance-the steady promo-
tion of peace and security-could become an effective means of achiev-
ing the Charter's primary object: international peace and security.
Further, from the political point of view, it must be concluded that,
because of political developments after 1945, the status of permanent
neutrality is no longer incompatible with the goals and principles of
the United Nations; membership of a permanently neutral country
in the Organization is not as untenable as it had seemed to the fram-
ers of the Charter. This conclusion, however, is correct only as long as
the political status quo that has developed in the post-war period re-
mains essentially unchanged. A political breakthrough in the relations
between the Great Powers that would end the deadlock in the Security
Council and restore freedom of action to the United Nations would
almost immediately result in a depreciation of neutrality and would,
once again, put the permanently neutral state in a difficult position.
III
LEGAL THEORIES OF UNITED NATIONS PARTICIPATION
While the door was thus politically open for the entry of permanently
neutral Austria into the United Nations, various theories were advanced
to explain how it was legally possible for a state with a permanently
neutral status to participate in the Organization and, more particularly,
what the legal implications connected with such participation were.
The difficulties were clearly seen at an early stage by both Verdross
and Kunz. The former, writing before the admission of Austria had
been completed in December 1955,44 tried to draw condusions from a
comparison of the status of neutral states under the Covenant of the
certain equilibrium between the blocs which, though unstable, assured at least
temporarily the maintenance of international peace and security.
•.. Since they are legally obliged not to participate in future armed con-
fliLcts, permanently neutral states are outside this equilibrium; their weight
does not count in the scales.
44. While his article was published in 50 AM. J. INTL' L. 61 (Supp. 1956), it apparently
was written in 1955.
1973]
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League of Nations45 and under the United Nations Charter. The key
provision of the Covenant was article 16, which obliged all member
states to break off immediately and directly all economic and financial
relations with any state which waged an aggressive war contrary to the
Covenant's principles. While members were not compelled to participate
in military action,46 they were under an obligation to permit the transit
of foreign troops carrying out military sanctions recommended by the
Council of the League.47 Furthermore, every member state was obliged
to blockade the aggressor.4 s Under those circumstances, the continuation
of impartial conduct vis-bt-vis all belligerents was inconceivable, and
with the loss of impartiality the basis of neutrality itself disappeared.
How then had it been possible for permanently neutral Switzerland to
enter the League?
In fact, admission was accomplished by a compromise. Realizing the
special situation of Switzerland, the Council of the League declared
that while all member states were obliged to take part in common
actions (thereby making permanent neutrality incompatible with the
Covenant), Switzerland was released from those duties that were most
objectionable from a neutral point of view, i.e., participation in military
sanctions and permitting the transit of foreign troops. It was more than
doubtful whether the Council was legally entitled to adopt such a view,
but it proved extremely useful. Shortly thereafter,49 the Swiss Govern-
ment declared that, in exchange for the concession made by the Council,
neutrality did not include an obligation to maintain economic equality.
Thus, Switzerland was free to enter the League.50 However, participation
in the latter's economic and financial sanctions during the Italo-Ethio-
pian War of 1935/1936 proved disastrous to the Swiss economy and
demonstrated with great impressiveness how difficult it was to take part
45. See Witton, La Neutralitd et [a Socidtd des Nations, 17 REcUEiL DES Cous 453
(1927).
46. Conclusion e contrario from the term "recommended" in article 16(2) of the
Covenant.
47. Article 16(3) of the Covenant states: "whey will take the necessary steps to
afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League
which are cooperating to protect the covenants of the League."
48. Article 16(1) of the Covenant states: ".... to subject it to the severance of all trade
or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and
the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, com-
mercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State
and the nationals of any other State ...."
49. On August 4, 1919; see D. ROBERT, ETUDE sut LA NEuri.ALxi SUss 88 (1950).
50. F. Glasl, Die Neutralitft der Schweiz im Sanktionssystem des Volkerbundes, 1967
(unpublished thesis in Vienna University Library).
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in sanctions against another state and at the same time to preserve the
appearance of neutrality.51 For this reason, the Swiss government, after
careful consideration of all circumstances, sent a note to the League
that it was no longer able to participate in economic measures. -52 Ac-
ceptance by the League of the Swiss statement allowed Switzerland to
return to integral neutrality, but still remain in the League of Nations.
Since April 29, 1938, the date of the Swiss notification, the League had,
at least politically, a permanently neutral member whose neutrality was
of the classical type. This political situation became a legal one on May
14, 1939, when the League formally accepted, without opposition, the
contents of the Swiss communication.
Compared with article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant, mem-
bership of a permanently neutral state in the United Nations seems to
be somewhat easier, in so far as the question of sanctions is concerned.
While membership in the League meant an immediate and direct
obligation to participate in economic measures against an aggressor
state and to permit the transit of troops engaged in military sanctions,
article 39 of the United Nations Charter provides that the Security
Council, after having determined "the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression... shall make recom-
mendations, or decide what measures shall be taken... to maintain or
restore international peace and security." This means that the Security
Council will determine whether a particular state will become involved
in enforcement actions.
Enforcement measures under chapter VII of the Charter are of two
kinds: measures not involving the use of armed force, according to
article 41; and military measures in accordance with article 42. Both
kinds, however, do not come into effect ipso facto; a Security Council
decision is necessary to impose a duty upon a member state to apply
such measures. This view is confirmed by the text of article 43(1)
(emphasis added):
All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the main-
tenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to
the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement
or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of
51. These sanctions were only partially carried out and thereby did more harm to
the reputation of the League than to the Italian economy.
52. 19 LEAGuE oF NATIONS OFr. J. 385 (1938). For an analysis of the development of
the relationship between Switzerland the League, see Keppler, Die Dauernde Neutralitdt
der Schweiz, 18 ZErrsam r FfR OFFENLICS REc=r 35 (1939).
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passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and
security.
Paragraph three of the same article states that these agreements, which
will govern the types, numbers, location, and other aspects of the forces
and the nature of the assistance to be provided, shall be negotiated "on
the initiative of the Security Council." 5 If, therefore, the Security
Council does not call upon a member state to conclude such an agree-
ment, the latter is freed from taking an active part in enforcement
measures.54 While the state still remains under the general obligation of
the second part of article 2(5) to refrain from giving assistance to an
aggressor state, this negative obligation does not, by itself, entail actions
that would be incompatible with a neutral status.
As far as the non-military (e.g., political and economic) measures pro-
vided for in article 41 are concerned, the question might be regarded
as different because the Security Council, when calling upon the mem-
ber states to apply non-military measures, would have to expressly
exempt a permanently neutral member.
From this legal situation Verdross drew the conclusion that a
permanently neutral state entering the United Nations does not even
need a formal dispensation from participation in military enforcement
actions such as that granted to Switzerland by the Council of the League
of Nations.55 Yet, he thought it would be useful if the Security Council
specifically relieved the permanently neutral member from even the
general obligation under article 2(5) "to give the United Nations every
assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter,"
by a resolution recognizing the permanently neutral status of a member
state and releasing it from the duty of implementing political and
economic sanctions ordered by the Security Council.
Kunz, who generally agrees with the arguments presented by Verdross,
expressed some doubt on whether the Security Council could be expected
to adopt such a resolution.56 Yet he considers such a step not absolutely
53. Similarly, it depends upon a special agreement with the Security Council as to
how and to what degree a member state should contribute to urgent military measures
taken by the United Nations. See article 45: . within the limits laid down in the
special agreement referred to in article 43 .
54. Accordingly, article 48 provides that "[t]he action required to carry out the deci-
sions of the Security Council ... shall be taken by all Members of the United Nations
or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine" (emphasis supplied).
55. Verdross, supra note 13, at 66.
56. At least implicitly; see Kunz, supra note 27, at 424. Kunz, who wrote his com-
ment after the admission of Austria to the United Nations, had thus witnessed the
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necessary for safeguarding the special legal status of a permanently
neutral state within the United Nations. As far as the Austrian case is
concerned, Kunz held that Austria's permanent neutrality was not
endangered by its membership in the United Nations, although it was
admitted without special allowance for its particular position. His
argument is evidently based on a type of estoppel or non venire contra
factum proprium theory. Accordingly, the United Nations would not be
permitted to call upon Austria for participation in enforcement measures
illegal under the law of neutrality.57
Zemanek sees in the admission of Austria to the United Nations by
the unanimous votes of the Security Council and the General Assembly
a specific interpretation of articles 2(2)us and 2559 of the Charter; these
provisions bind the Security Council "to use its discretionary power
under articles 43 and 48 to exempt Austria from any action which would
compel it to violate duties of permanent neutrality."60 Furthermore, the
obligation of respecting Austria's special status does not only fall upon
the Security Council as a body, but also upon all the permanent and
non-permanent members which have recognized the country's neutral
position. Any of the permanent members of the Council, by casting a
negative vote in connection with a proposal to have Austria participate
in measures contrary to its duties as a permanently neutral state, ex-
ercises a veto preventing Austria from being called upon to take part
in any enforcement actions.61
entry of a permanently neutral state into the Organization without an express recog-
nition of the country's special status within the Organization.
57. Austria's permanent neutrality had only recently come into international legal
existence by recognition by the majority of the permanent members of the Security
Council and many other member states of the Organization. All states recognizing the
special Austrian status had become bound to respect it, an obligation that was valid
inside as well as outside the United Nations. Therefore, the Security Council could not
call upon Austria to co-operate in the system of collective security. Verdross, Neutrality
Within the Framework of the United Nations Organization, in SymBo.. VzPjrL 410,
416 (1958), where he avers that "[ira order to obligate Austria to engage in non-military
sanctions, all permanent members of the Security Council would have to disregard its
permanent neutrality before recognized by them." See also Chaumont, La Neutralitd
de l'Autriche et les Nations Unies, 1 ANUAma FRANqnAS DE DROIT INTERNATIoNAL 151-57
1955), and, by the same author, Nations Unies et Neutralitd, 89 Rrcumr. DES CoUrs 5
1956).
58. "All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting
from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in ac-
cordance with the present Charter." U.N. CHrTER art. 2, para. 2.
59. "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." Id. art. 25.
60. Zemanek, supra note 29, at 414.
61. Id.
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Yet, this is only one line of argument in which the theory of implied
recognition and the principle of good faith lead to an acceptable solu-
tion to the problem of the compatibility of neutrality with membership
in the United Nations.
The complexity of the problem was demonstrated during the Seventh
Congress of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers held
at Sofia, Bulgaria, in 1960. After a lengthy discussion of the position of
neutrality in contemporary international law, a final resolution was
adopted which tends to support the view that contemporary neutrality
is consistent with the principles and purposes of the United Nations
Charter.6 2 In fact, however, the formulation used is evasive since it does
not say which shall be controlling when the obligations under the
Charter are in conflict with those of the permanently neutral status.
Both solutions, if reached by legal reasoning, are capable of being
called consistent with international law in general, and the Charter in
particular. At the Bulgarian Congress views similar to those of Verdross,
Kunz, and Zemanek, were defended by Mr. Frederik from Belgium,
while Mr. Gyula from Hungary and Mr. Georgiev from Bulgaria arrived
at contrary conclusions.68 Their views were probably based on the posi-
tion taken in an article published two years earlier in the Soviet Year-
book of International Law.04 There again, the opinion was stated that
neutrality fully corresponded to the aims, spirit, and letter of the United
Nations Charter. The reasoning, however, by which this conclusion was
reached, was totally different:
[I]n 1955 Austria, a perpetually neutral country, was accepted as a member of
the UN without any reservations. This signified that all provisions of the
Charter are binding upon it. Although in cases of armed conflict arising be-
tween members of the UN in defense of peace, on the one hand, and states
violating peace, on the other hand, Austria cannot be impartial and adopt an
equal attitude to the belligerents as stipulated in the Hague Conventions of
1907; this would not be, on its part, violation of international law.65
This view is clearly based on the opinion that by admitting Austria to
the United Nations all members of the Organization have renounced
their right to rely on Austria's neutral status as far as sanctions under
62. VIITH CONGIRESS OF THE INTvENATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEmOCRATIC LAwYmEs,
LEGAL AsPzcrs OF NErA MrY 7 (1963).
63. See Zemanek, su$pra note 29, at 414 n.28.
64. Galina, Neutrality in Contemporary International Law, 1958 Sovmr YEIaanooa
OF INTERNATioNAL LAw 200. The article is published in Russian with an accompanying
English summary at 225.
65. Id. at 228-29 (emphasis added).
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chapter VII of the Charter are concerned, while Austria, by applying
for membership, has renounced the right to invoke its permanent
neutrality to evade participation in enforcement measures.
In this connection, it is noteworthy that Lalive had maintained as
early as 194766 that participation by a neutral state in measures taken
in conformity with a decision of the Security Council would not be a
violation of its duty, as long as those measures did not involve the use
of force. Non-military measures did not in themselves constitute an act
of belligerency. The neutral could then find itself in a position which
would be characterized as "qualified neutrality." Such a position would
be similar to that of Switzerland between 1919 and 1938. Lalive also uses
the argument of implied consent:
The state affected by these measures cannot legally complain of being the vic-
tim of an unfriendly act, nor could it legally adopt measures of retaliation. By
its acceptance of the Charter it has in anticipation acquiesced in such mea-
sures.67
Because of the contradictory opinions as to the effects of a permanently
neutral state's membership in the United Nations, the correct position
cannot be conclusively ascertained from doctrine alone; there must be
some reference to the political situation in Central Europe in 1955. An
analysis of this situation proves that Austria was given her State Treaty
only by reason of the Austrian delegation's promise in the Memorandum
of Moscow that the country would adopt a permanently neutral status.
This "neutralization" was the main purpose of the arrangement agreed
upon by the Big Four and Austria, an arrangement in which the State
Treaty, the declaration and notification of Austria's permanent neutral-
ity, and her admission to the United Nations were interrelated steps.
It was this permanent neutrality of Austria which the occupying
Powers, and primarily the Soviet Union, were interested in, and not the
strengthening of the system of collective security by the integration of
Austria into that system. If, therefore, Austria's neutrality was the
primary object and her cooperation in the United Nations system of
collective security only the secondary object of the arrangement made
in 1955, it is clear that the duties resulting from the "lower," or ac-
cidental obligation, will have to cede to the "higher," or essential
66. Lalive, International Organization and Neutrality, 24 BPaisH Y.APstooK oF INTEmR-
NATIONAL LAW 72 (1947).
67. Id. at 80.
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obligation. In the event of a conflict between the duties resulting, on
the one hand, from Austria's neutrality, and, on the other, from her
membership in United Nations, the former will prevail. 8
Iv
THE AUSTRIAN PRACTICE OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY
Before turning to the question of a permanently neutral state in the
Security Council, several illustrations of the Austrian practice as a
permanently neutral member of the United Nations, which has developed
over a seventeen year period, are in order.
A. SANCIONs AGAINST RHODESIA
In disregard of the constitutional competence of the British Parlia-
ment and without respect for the aspirations of the colored majority of
the nation's population, the government of Rhodesia-then a British
dominion enjoying internal self-government and a few external powers 9
-- declared its independence, 70 giving rise to reactions by both the United
Kingdom and the United Nations.71 This unilateral declaration was
condemned by both the General Assembly72 and the Security Council78
and was declared to be null and void.74 The United Kingdom was called
upon to quash the rebellion. All other states were asked not to entertain
relations with the illegal regime in-Rhodesia and to cut off all economic
ties with it. These measures having failed to crush the rebellion in
Rhodesia, the Security Council, on December 16, 1966, passed another
resolution containing much more stringent measures.7 5 All member
68. This is, by the way, in conformity with the official Soviet doctrine regarding per.
manently neutral states and the United Nations. See THE INsrrru or LAw, AcADEmY
OF SCIENCES OF THE USSR, INTERNATIONAL LAW (F. Kozhevnikov ed. 1957).
69. See 1964 BRisH PRACIICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 123 (E. Lauterpacht ed.), con-
taining a statement to this effect made by the British Secretary of State for Common.
wealth Relations.
70. On November 11, 1965. On the previous situation see J. & S. FAworr, THE
BarnsH COmMONwEALTH IN INTERNATiONAL LAw (1963).
71. As a "racist" regime, the government in Rhodesia shares unpopularity with
South Africa. On questions concerning apartheid, domestic jurisdiction, and Article 2(7)
of the United Nations Charter, see Koeck, Ist Artikel 2 Ziffer 7 Satzung der Vereinren
Nationen Tot?, 22 osTERREICHUScHE ZEITUNG EtiR OFFENTruCHEs REcHT 327 (1971).
72. GA. Res. 2024 (XX), 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 55, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
73. S/Res. 216, [1965] S.C. Rrs. & DEc. 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/20/Rev. 1.
74. S/Res. 217, [1965] S.C. Rs. & DEc. 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/20/Rev. I.
75. SIRes. 232, [1966] S.C. Rrs. & DEc. 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev. I.
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states of the United Nations were ordered to stop the importation of
certain Rhodesian commodities and to cease exporting war materiel,
military aircraft and vehicles, oil, and oil products to Rhodesia. In this
resolution member states were reminded "that the failure or refusal by
any of them to implement the present resolution shall constitute a
violation of article 25 of the Charter."7 6 Finally, all states, even those
not members of the United Nations, were called upon "not to render
financial or other economic aid to the illegal racist regime in Southern
Rhodesia."
77
The measures taken by the Security Council were "measures not
involving the use of armed force" under article 41; they were the first
enforcement measures Austria had to face since admission to the Orga-
nization, and the Security Council had not made special allowance in
the resolution for Austria's permanently neutral status.7 8
The government of Austria, after careful consideration of all the
legal questions involved, decided to participate in these sanctions.79 In
its report relating to the implementation of Security Council Resolution
232 (1966),80 however, the Austrian government emphasized that this
could not be regarded as constituting a precedent for the future.81
Austria's decision to participate in the sanctions against Rhodesia
seems to have been based primarily on the ground that there did not
exist an international war; Rhodesia was not yet an independent coun-
try. This opinion is derived from the view that, under international
law, a secession cannot be regarded as successful, and the seceding terri-
tory as a state, as long as the original sovereign has not given up his
efforts to regain control.8 2 Neither the United Kingdom nor any other
state had recognized Rhodesia as a "state" or even as a "belligerent."
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. at 15.
78. See Zemanek, Das Problem der Beteiligung des Immerwahrend Neutralen 45ster-
reich an Sanktionen des Vereinten Nationen, Besonders im Falle Rhodesiens, 28 Zmrr-
scnIUFT FRi Ausr.XmiscHqs OFEEmlCuHs R cacr uN V6LxRmEcrrr 16 (1968) [English
summary at 80].
79. In previous years, Austria had imported mainly tobacco from Rhodesia, together
with unsubstantial amounts of copper and asbestos. These imports were stopped. Austria
had never been engaged in the export of war matdriel of any kind to Rhodesia.
80. Made by the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations on
February 28, 1967.
81. U.N. Doc. S/7795 (mimeo 1967), substantive portion reproduced in 22 U.N. SCOR,
Supp. Jan.-Dec. 1967, at 74, 155-56, U.N. Doc. S/7781/Add. 2 (1967).
82. Zemanek, supra note 78, at 24, relying on G. DAHmr, I V6LKmmEaEcT 136 (1958);
Bindschedler, Die Anerkennung im V6lkerrecht, 4 Bmaz nmt DEuTsOHE GEsEL-
scHaFT rFm V6La RElcT 8 (1961); and A. VERDnoss, V4LxEaERcHT 248 (5th ed. 1964).
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Thus, the rebellion in Rhodesia did not qualify as a war as the term is
used in international law. Because obligations arising from the status of
neutrality in wartime presuppose the existence of such a war, no neutral
duties had arisen for Austria. 8
Zemanek, however, claims the Austrian attitude was correct in this
case even under the assumption that the Rhodesian conflict must legally
be regarded as a war.84 It will be remembered that the Security Coun-
cil's resolution referred both to imports from, and exports to, Rhodesia.
As far as imports are concerned, the neutral state does not have any
obligation to continue them at previously established levels. While a
reduction in imports would be contrary to the declared Swiss policy of
the courant normal, Zemanek regards the latter as a political, not a
legal principle, binding not even Switzerland.85 With regard to exports,
the situation would be different. A neutral country is obliged to treat
both belligerents equally as far as war materiel is concerned. However,
since Austria had never exported banned material to Rhodesia, the
problem of whether Austria could have imposed restrictions on these
exports remained hypothetical.
It is clear that the case of the Rhodesian sanctions does not provide
a final answer to the correct legal attitude of a permanently neutral
member state of the United Nations towards enforcement measures taken
by the Security Council under chapter VII of the Charter. Yet, it permits
some interesting observations.
First, the membership of a permanently neutral state in the Organiza-
tion favors its participation in enforcement measures. Thus, Austria
took part in the sanctions against Rhodesia while Switzerland refused to
do so. Second, as a member of the United Nations, the permanently
neutral state is inclined to adopt a legal view of the situation that
permits it to concur with the Security Council's decision. In the case
83. Zemanek, supra note 78, at 32. It might be interesting to note, in this connection,
that permanently neutral Switzerland decided to refrain from either participating in
the sanctions imposed or aiding the object of the sanctions, Rhodesia: e.g., the decision
taken by the Swiss government on February 10, 1967, permitting the continuation of
trade with Rhodesia to the traditional extent, i.e., the courant normal. See Bindschedler,
Das Problem der Beteiligung der Schweiz an Sanktionen der Vereinten Nationen,
Besonders im Falle Rhodesians, 28 Zrrscmur ri Aummscm O u Turracnxs Race-r
uuN V6LERtREcHT 1 ff. (1968) [with English summary at 15]. Bindschedler thinks that
the question whether the Rhodesian conflict is to be considered as an international or
an internal one is irrelevant for the solution of the problem.
84. Zemanek, supra note 78, at 29-30.
85. Id.
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of Rhodesia, this meant that Austria seemingly proceeded on the legal
ground that Rhodesia was not a "state" and the conflict not an "inter-
national war." Third, the position taken by the permanently neutral
member is not likely to meet with criticism within the Organization
as long as this member supports the Organization in carrying out its
enforcement measures. Fourth, the Rhodesian situation does not shed
light on the problem of whether the position of the permanently neutral
member would be equally comfortable if the Organization were divided
on the question of whether or not to take enforcement measures, and
the measures were adopted against the opposition of a significant
minority.
If the case of Rhodesia proves that a permanently neutral member
of the United Nations does not have to remain inactive in the cause of
peace, even in the case of sanctions under chapter VII of the Charter,
the various possibilities open to such a neutral member can be illustrated
by a further example.
B. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
On June 30, 1965, a Federal Constitutional Law was passed by the
Austrian Parliament which empowered the Austrian Government to
send military and other personnel abroad for the purpose of participat-
ing in international actions taken under the responsibility of an inter-
national organization.8 6 The first paragraph of this Law provides that
the government, when making use of its powers under the Law, shall
have due regard to Austria's permanent neutrality as declared in 1955.
The preparatory documents87 that were before the House, together with
the text of the statute, laid special emphasis on the necessity of the
Austrian Government proceeding with the utmost caution so as not to
endanger the nation's neutral status.88
While the Explanatory Remarks expressed the opinion that such
participation was, in itself, not inconsistent with the Austrian obliga-
tions resulting from permanent neutrality, it was still considered neces-
86. [1965] Austrian BGBI. 173.
87. These documents are known in this form as Erldutcrnde Bemerkungen [hereinafter
referred to as Explanatory Remarks].
88. Erlduternde Bemerkungen zfir Regierungsvorlage vom 25 Februar 1965 (633 der
Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates, X. Gesetzgebungs-
periode), partly reprinted in 6 0sna EascHsmE ZEriscHRiFT FUR AussENmPoLITr 35-36
(1966).
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sary that the Law explicitly refer to the 1955 Declaration of Neutrality
to make certain that the former's provisions would not be construed
so as to abrogate the latter. This caution demonstrated that the Austrian
Government which had prepared the new Law for consideration in
Parliament felt it was taking a step into the border area of neutrality
and international solidarity, an area in which it was particularly im-
portant to make dear that support of one law did not signify abandon-
ment of the other.
Following the adoption of this Law, an agreement was concluded
between Austria and the United Nations concerning an Austrian con-
tingent to be made available for the United Nations Force in Cyprus. 9
This Force was operationally established in Cyprus on March 27, 1964,
pursuant to a Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964,00 passed
after consultations with the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
and the United Kingdom.
In a lecture given to the Austrian Chamber of Commerce in Zurich
on June 14, 1966,91 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Ton&i&Sorinj,
declared that his country not only considered its participation in the
"peacekeeping operations" of the United Nations as compatible with
its neutral status, but that cooperation in actions like this had come
to be regarded as a special function of the neutral or non-aligned states
within the Organization. "Peacekeeping operations" of the United Na-
tions are not directed against any state; they take place only in answer
to a specific request of the countries concerned and with the express
consent of the state on whose territory the peacekeeping force will be
stationed. Thus, they are not "enforcement measures" for the main-
tenance or restoration of peace under chapter VII of the Charter.
Rather it is a surrogate for such actions which have become impossible
because of the deadlock in the Security Council. Yet the purpose of the
"peacekeeping operations" is similar to that of "enforcement measures,"
for the function of the peacekeeping forces is the maintenance of inter-
89. The agreement took the form of an exchange of notes between the Secretary
General and the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations and
became effective on February 28, 1966. The original English version is reprinted in 6
OsrRREIcmscnE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSSENPOLITIK 38-40 (1966).
90. Resolution Adopted on 4 March 1964 Concerning the Situation in Cyprus, 19
U.N. SCOR, Supp. Jan.-Dec. 1964, at 102, U.N. Doc. Sf5575 (1964).
91. In Die Gemeinsamkeiten und Yerschiedenheiten der Schweizerschen und der
0sterreichischen Neutralitdt, 6 60rumn CHucBm ZErscmRr FRi Aussm :oLrrm 169
(1966).
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national peace and security. The military actions taken by ONUC92
in the Congo, and in particular those to prevent the secession of the
Katanga province, had a disturbing similarity to the "enforcement
measures" that would be taken against a recalcitrant state, even though
the legal circumstances in the two cases are quite different.
What might have been the position of neutral Austria had it sent to
the Congo not a medical corps (the Austrian Constitution did not then
provide for the participation of fighting units in actions under United
Nations command), but military personnel proper? What if the Austrian
soldiers had become engaged in combat? What if the United Nations
action had proved abortive and Katanga had become an independent
state? These questions raise the problem of whether participation in
mere "peacekeeping operations" is really an absolute guaranty of be-
coming involved only in actions that are carried out "for peace" and
"against nobody." Might not such participation put the permanently
neutral state, under certain circumstances, in a position which is, at
least in fact if not in law, quite similar to that of participation in
military enforcement measures?
Yet, Austria considers participation in "peacekeeping operations" of
the United Nations a special function of a neutral state in the system
of the Organization. It is submitted that in this attitude may be seen
one of the keys for understanding the legal position that made Austria's
entry into the Security Council possible. We now turn to this question.
V
AUSTRIA'S CANDIDACY FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Austria's candidacy for a non-permanent seat in the Security Council
began in 1970. 93 At that time, however, it was unsuccessful, probably
because it lacked the political preparation necessary to withstand the
pressure of a time deadline.94 Recognizing that its chances were ex-
92. ONUC stands for the United Nations Organization in the Congo (abbreviation
based on the French).
93. It had been during a press conference on April 28, 1970, that Austria's new
Foreign Minister, Rudolf Kirchschlager, confirmed rumors to the effect that the Per-
manent Representative of Austria to the United Nations had been instructed to declare
his country's intention to run for one of the non-permanent seats in the Security
Council which traditionally belong to the group of 'Western European and Other
States." Cf. Chronik zfir (sterreichischen Aussenpolitik, 10 srmmcEnscrE ZarrscmauT
nFf AussaNoLrriK 97, 109 (1970).
94. Mr. Kirchschl~ger explained to the Austrian Parliament on November 26, 1970,
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tremely limited, Austria withdrew in favor of the two original candidates
from the group of "Western European and Other States," Belgium and
Italy, but registered its intention to run again for the 1973-74 period.
The group acknowledged Austria's "spirit of solidarity" and assured
Austria of its support in 1972.95
The Austrian Foreign Minister, Mr. Kirchschlfger, took every op-
portunity to explain that Austria's application was not an act motivated
by ambition, but one dictated by strong feelings of responsibility.00
Because of its permanently neutral position, it was particularly appro-
priate for Austria to enter the Security Council. Since Austria is both
a country with great historical experience (but one that had never taken
part in colonialism) and an impartial state that has played an active
part in international life, it was especially suited for the role of mediator
and conciliator. Austria was therefore determined to take advantage of
the opportunity offered to it to make a valuable contribution to inter-
national relations. Austria should not live in permanent fear that
complications could arise in connection with its neutral status. In an
address to the Osterreichische Gesellschaft filr Aussenpolitik (a private
association dealing with matters of foreign politics) Mr. Kirchschl9iger
said:
Since the days of 1955, when I had the opportunity to cooperate in the phrasing
of the Neutrality Law ... I have always supported this permanent neutrality
.*.. because I consider it to be the most adequate status for Austria. But I am
equally convinced that this permanent neutrality does not constitute only a
plurality of obligations for Austria; it offers also a great number of opportu-
nities and rights. Among those there is the opportunity to assume functions
which demand impartiality and, at the same time, energy of decision, and for
which a certain historical experience is useful. For the exercise of those func-
ti ons, the Security Council, the central organ for the maintenance of world
peace, is the [proper] forum. For long years we had to struggle to obtain
membership in the United Nations; should we now be the only state in the
Orga'ization reduced to a second-class member that is not permitted to take
part in the UN's leading body? I think that our country and our foreign
polly are too good for such a role.97
that it had been necessary to reach a quick decision on the question of the Austrian
candidacy, for the government had to deal with the issue only one week after having
taken over from the caretaker government that was in office following the recently-held
general elections.
95. Cf. Chronik zir ?sterreichischen Aussenpolitik, supra note 93, at 330-31. On the
question of a possible Austrian membership in the Security Council and a comparison
of the pro's and con's thereof, see Koeck, Der Gefirliche Balanceaht Zwischen Wien
und New York, 8 POLriTsCHE PERsPEKiVEN 10 ff. (1972). This comment was written
before the final decision on Austria's candidacy had been taken.
96. See, e.g., 10 OsTERMREIHiscE ZEMrscHRIFr R AussENPOLImT 248 (1970).
97. Id. at 414 (author's translation).
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Austria's decision to run for a seat on the Security Council was
certainly influenced by the experiences of both Sweden (a member of the
Council during 1957-58) and Finland (a member of the Council during
1969-70). While not permanently neutral in a legal sense, these two
countries traditionally followed a policy of neutrality.98 Both countries
were very satisfied with the opportunity offered to them through their
membership on the Security Council to play a conciliatory role and, at
the same time, to strengthen their own political positions within the
Organization. 9 If both Sweden and Finland had found it possible and
even convenient to sit in the Council, why should this not be equally
true for Austria?
The Austrian candidacy was presented again in 1972 and this time
was successful.100 For the period of 1973-74, the Security Council will
be faced with the situation of having a permanently neutral member.
What are the political and legal implications of this situation, both
for the Organization and for Austria? Is participation in the work of
the Security Council nothing more than the extension of activity
essentially identical to that carried on for seventeen years in the various
other organs of the United Nations? Or is cooperation in the activities
of the Council fundamentally different from that in other United Nations
organs?
VI
MEMBERSHIP IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
There can be no doubt that membership in the other organs of the
United Nations, especially in the General Assembly and in the Eco-
nomic and Social Council, also creates problems from the point of view
of a neutral policy. Here, too, Austria is called upon to take a stand
and state her position regarding such difficult issues of international
politics as decolonization, apartheid, and Rhodesia, and to cast her vote
on questions of utmost importance, such as the transfer of the Chinese
seat in the Organization from the Taipei to the Peking government. It
would be incorrect to assume that the position Austria assumed con-
98. See generally H. BLx, SovrazIGNTY, AcGRESsION AND NEUTRALITY (1970); and M.
JAnOBSON, FiNNLANDs NEUTrALrrXTSPOLIrIK ZwIscMN OsT UmN Wzsr (1969).
99. See Wildhaber, Die Mitgliedschaft Dauernde Neutraler Staaten im UNO-Sicher-
heitsrat, 11 Osr cmiscHE ZEMrrsCH RT FOR AUSSENPOLITIK 131, 142 (1971).
100, See note 1 supra.
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cerning those problems has no effect on her neutral status. Considera-
tions of this kind have made Switzerland hesitant until now to apply
for admission to the United Nations. On the other hand, permanent
neutrality is not synonymous with an unprincipled international atti-
tude; the permanently neutral state should not be regarded as bound to
keep complete silence in all questions of international law and morality.
Austria has never tried to conceal her convictions and yet has been
successful in steering an independent course. This success in maintaining
an independent neutrality has also been recognized by Switzerland
which, though not participating in the United Nations, is a member of
various Specialized Agencies. In these agencies Switzerland is quite often
called upon to vote on questions having strong political implications
without, so far, having suffered any political damage or any loss of credi-
bility as a neutral country. The Swiss government has therefore come to
the conclusion that "the risks connected with membership in the United
Nations should not be overrated."' 01
The situation in the Security Council, however, is quite different.
While this organ has various functions under the Charter its main
task-its raison d'tre-is the maintenance and restoration of peace.102
For this purpose it participates under chapter VI of the Charter in the
settlement of international disputes, and determines under chapter VII
those measures that are necessary for the realization of international
peace and security. Quick and efficient action on the part of the Security
Council is, however, dependent upon the ability of the Council mem-
bers to arrive, within an appropriate time, at a satisfactory agreement
among themselves about the necessary steps to be taken.
Decisions of the Security Council are of two kinds:103 those on pro-
cedural matters; and those on substantive matters. Decisions of the
Security Council on procedural matters require the affirmative vote of
nine of its fifteen members; decisions on substantive matters can be
adopted only by an affirmative vote of nine members including the
101. [1969] Swiss BB1. 1570 (author's translation).
102. Article 24(1) of the U.N. Charter: "In order to ensure prompt and effective
action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primarily
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security...."
103. The electoral procedure for filling the seats on the International Court of
Justice-which requires, in the Security Council, an absolute majority of votes (i.e.,
eight) without making any distinction between permanent and non-permanent members
of the Council-provides a third voting formula to be applied by this body, but is of
comparatively lesser importance. I.C.J. SrAT. art. 10, para. 1.
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concurring vote of all five permanent members.104 It appears from these
provisions that decisions of the Security Council in all important matters
depend primarily on the cooperation among the members holding a
permanent seat. If only one of them exercises its right of veto the pro-
posal is not adopted.105 However, the permanent members cannot adopt
any proposal alone; they need the support of at least four of the mem-
bers holding non-permanent seats. Therefore, the latter's attitude might
become crucial, especially where certain permanent members, although
not voting against a draft resolution, demonstrate their disapproval by
abstention. Since, in such a case, a non-permanent but aligned member
can be expected to follow the lead of the Great Power to which it has
dose military, political or economic ties, a proposal might be lost, not
by reason of any veto, but simply because of the lack of sufficient
support marshalled by it. This, of course, is a legitimate process in the
system of international democracy; a proposal that cannot gather
sufficient support should fail to be carried.
Membership of a permanently neutral state in the Security Council,
however, distorts this legitimate democratic process of international
decision-making. It has, until now, been undisputed that permanently
neutral states in the Council may not, because of their special interna-
tional status, vote in favor of employing measures under chapter VII of
the Charter against a state that had been determined by the Security
Council to be guilty of threatening, or having breached the peace, or
having committed an act of aggression.10' When faced with a proposal
to take sanctions against an aggressor the permanently neutral state has
no choice but to abstain. However, if the permanently neutral state
abstains in such a situation its membership in the Security Council
becomes nonsensical, since this member may prevent, by its abstention,
the adoption of a proposal aimed at the fulfillment of the Council's
main function. This abstention would be exercised contrary to the
spirit, if not the letter, of the Charter, since it would not be based on
any grounds connected with the specific case in question, but rather on
legal and political grounds related to the status of neutrality, i.e., on
grounds unrelated to the case being considered by the Council. This
104. U.N. CmsTa art. 27, para. 2.
105. Contrary to the wording of Charter article 27(3), the mere abstention of a
permanent member of the Council does not prevent the adoption of a decision if it
has otherwise obtained the required majority. See L. SoHN, supra note 41, at 135-48.
106. See Wildhaber, supra note 99, at 140.
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means that the permanently neutral state would have to cast its vote not
with respect to the merits of the problems being dealt with by the
Security Council, but with regard to its own status, which obligates it to
treat all parties to a dispute equally. 07
It is dear that neither Austria, when she announced her intention to
run for a non-permanent seat in the Council, nor the General Assembly,
when it elected Austria to this position, were unaware of the situation
just mentioned. Yet, both considered it desirable that Austria enter the
Council. Why?
If the problem is examined while considering the twenty-seven year
history of the United Nations, the conclusion will be reached that be-
cause of the antagonism between East and West, the Security Council is
today a forum for political discussion, mediation, and conciliation rather
than a decision-making organ of collective security. The Council
arrives at a decision not by quasi-judicial investigation but by com-
promise, based on a complex process of negotiation and bargaining. The
policy of the Council has, therefore, been termed not a policy of
collective security but a policy of "collective neutrality."108
Under these circumstances, a permanently neutral country can fulfill
its mission of pacigdrance even within the Security Council. Nevertheless,
it should not be overlooked that a concept of the United Nations which
permits a permanently neutral state not only to become a member of
the Organization, but also to obtain a seat in its leading organ no longer
has very much in common with the concept upon which the Organiza-
don was originally framed. The entry of Austria into the Security
Council signifies, with great clarity, the final breakdown of the system
of San Francisco, a system that purported to guarantee peace through
collective security.
The view that the deadlock within the Security Council was merely
a transitory difficulty in the management of the United Nations must
now finally be discarded; it has been for some time only a fiction. The
United Nations, by making a permanently neutral state a member of
the Council, has demonstrated that it does not believe in the possibility
that it can, in the forseeable future, return to the proper exercise of its
original functions. State practice and doctrine will have to take into
account, to a greater extent, this development.
107. See Koeck, supra note 95, at 11.
108. This expression was used for the first time by D. FRan, DiMENSIONEN NEuTRALER
POLmK 24 (1969).
